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An Experiment on Innovation and Collusion
Andrew Smyth
Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between product innovation and the success of price collusion using novel
laboratory experiments. Average market prices in low innovation (LO) experiments are significantly higher than
those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments. This price difference is attributed to LO
experimental subjects' greater common market experience. The data illustrate how collusion can be perceived
as the "only way to make it" in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable strategy for increasing
profits. They suggest that product homogeneity can be a proximate cause, and product innovation an ultimate
cause, of collusion.
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ABBREVIATIONS
HI High Innovation
LA Liberal Arts School
LO Low Innovation
LOB Line of Business
R Research School
R&D Research and Development
SHI "Super" High Innovation
SIC Standard Industry Classification
VIFs Variance Inflation Factors

I. Introduction
[W]e're not competing with a unique article here. Our bags and boxes aren't really any better or worse
than those of our competitors...The only way to get a buyer is to sell at a lower price. Thus competitors
may think that the only way to make it is to get together and fix prices.
— Folding box executive who participated in a price conspiracy1
This paper tests whether price collusion is more successful in markets like the epigraph's folding cardboard box
market, than in markets where firms can more easily innovate to escape competition. It reports data from
laboratory experiments where subjects repeatedly make "product innovation" and pricing decisions. The
experimental treatments differ only in the ex ante likelihood of innovation, and so mimic two very different
markets: "high innovation" (HI) markets where firms frequently develop differentiated new products and "low
innovation" (LO) markets where firms almost always sell homogeneous products.
The empirical price fixing literature finds that collusive markets are often characterized by product
homogeneity.2 Product innovation affects the degree of product homogeneity in a market, so it is natural to ask:
how does product innovation affect price collusion? This paper aims to help fill a void in the literature by
empirically examining the causal link between product innovation, product differentiation, and price collusion.3
In the experiments reported here, "product innovation" is a function of an exogenous parameter that
determines the likelihood of innovative success, and of subjects' endogenous decisions about how much to
spend on innovation. Innovative success results in perfect product differentiation, whereas innovative failure
means perfect product homogeneity. The experimental design varies the aforementioned exogenous innovation
parameter across treatments—holding all else constant.
By design there are no predicted price differences between the HI and LO treatments, yet observed prices in the
LO treatments are significantly greater than those in the HI treatments. The data show that subjects in the LO
treatments are better at maintaining supra‐competitive prices than their HI counterparts. Moreover, while this
collusive success is affected by the exogenously determined likelihood of innovative success, collusive success
does not affect innovation expenditure, so the price results are driven by the exogenous innovation parameter.
The results reported in this paper suggest that a lack of product innovation can be the ultimate cause of
collusive success, whereas product homogeneity resulting from a lack of product innovation is a proximate cause
of collusive success. The experimental data illustrate how collusion can come to be perceived as the "only way
to make it" in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable way to increase profits. In the next section, I
motivate the use of laboratory experiments. In Section III, I outline the experimental design, calculate innovation
benchmarks for the experiments, and report the experimental data. Section IV concludes the paper.

II. Why an Experiment?
Before discussing the experimental design, I first motivate my use of laboratory experiments by outlining the
shortcomings of using archival data to examine the relationship between innovation and collusion. I created a
sample of historical price conspiracies by examining all citations listed under "price fixing" in the indices of
Commerce Clearing House Trade Cases books for the years 1972–1982. My sample includes all (prosecuted)
horizontal price conspiracies that took place in a Standard Industry Classification (SIC) manufacturing industry. I
chose this 10‐year sample period in order to match the conspiracy sample with data from the Federal Trade
Commission's Annual Line of Business (LOB) Report for 1977.4
Table A1 in the Appendix lists the final sample, which totals 50 conspiracies. Thirty‐seven of the 50 (74%)
occurred in industries with below‐average research and development (R&D) intensity, as calculated from the
LOB data.5 A robust rank order test concludes that the mean of the distribution of R&D intensities for collusive
industries is lower than the corresponding mean for noncollusive industries (𝑈 = 1.86, 𝑝 = 0.032, one‐tailed).
Table gives estimation results for two Probit specifications.6 The variable Collusion is an indicator for a
conspiracy having been detected and punished in the SIC industry during a 10‐year window around
1977. Profit is calculated as the ratio of operating income to sales, ADInt is a proxy for product differentiation
and is calculated as the ratio of advertising expense to revenue, Size proxies barriers to entry and is the natural
logarithm of assets, and C4 is the industry's adjusted four‐firm concentration ratio.7 Finally, RDInt is R&D
intensity, calculated as the ratio of firm R&D costs to revenue.
Table 1: Probit Estimates
Dependent Variable: Collusion
Independent Variable (1)
Constant
−2.854
(1.275)
Profit
−2.965
(2.562)
ADInt
−9.418
(6.738)
Size
0.196
(0.094)
C4
−0.013
(0.007)
RDInt
Observations
Log‐likelihood

217
−84.43

(2)
−3.288
(1.438)
−1.159
(2.751)
−9.659
(6.601)
0.234
(0.104)
−0.012
(0.007)
−19.280
(10.156)
202
−78.14

1 Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
• 2 * Significant at the 10% level.
• 3 ** Significant at the 5% level.
• 4 ***Significant at the 1% level.

Model 1 is similar to a specification in Asch and Seneca's (1976) well‐known empirical price‐fixing study, and the
estimates here are qualitatively the same. Model 2 adds RDInt to the specification. Its coefficient estimate is
statistically significant and negative in sign. The addition of RDInt to the specification causes a statistically
significant improvement in log‐likelihood (𝐿𝑅 = 12.57, 𝑝 < 0.001).

The inverse relationship between Collusion and RDInt in Model 2 is at least consistent with innovation affecting
price collusion. However, collinearity is a potential issue here.8 Another possible problem is that the price
conspiracy data suffer to an unknown degree from selection bias. Collusion may indicate not only collusion‐
prone industries, but that subset of collusion‐prone industries which are also prosecution‐prone. It is certainly
possible that successful collusive occurred in additional industries but escaped the detection of antitrust
authorities.9
Even ignoring possible econometric issues, the significant, negative coefficient estimate on RDInt in Model 2
reveals correlation between price collusion and R&D intensity, not necessarily causation. The inverse
relationship might stem from firms who are successfully colluding, reducing their innovation intensities. Such
behavior has been empirically documented: Erickson (1976) reports that price conspiracies had a detrimental
effect on cost innovation in gymnasium seating, rock salt, and structural steel.
With these issues in mind, laboratory experiments were conducted to see if exogenous variation in the
likelihood of innovation causes observed variance in the success of price collusion.10

III. The Experiments
These experiments were designed to incorporate "product innovation" into laboratory markets so as to permit
exogenous variation in the likelihood of innovation across multiple treatments. In this paper, "successful
collusion" refers to firms' abilities to maintain supra‐competitive prices. If the data reveal differences in market
prices across treatments, they support the conjecture that innovation affects the success of price collusion.
The laboratory research most related to these experiments involves product differentiation (see Brown-Kruse, et
al., 1993; Brown-Kruse and Schenk, 2000; Collins and Sherstyuk, 2000; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2001;
Barreda-Tarrazona, et al., 2011). In these papers, differentiation is captured by location choice. Here, innovation
success or failure determines the number of firms in a market. Innovation is not rivalrous—one subject's
innovation success is independent of another's.11 If successful, subjects enjoy one period of monopoly power; if
unsuccessful, they must compete with other unsuccessful subjects in a Bertrand–Edgeworth market.
In this paper, successful innovation affords an innovator a perfectly appropriable market. When unsuccessful,
appropriability is nil; subjects compete in a perfectly homogeneous market whose size varies from one to four
firms. This stark design allows for exogenous variation in the ex ante likelihood of innovative success. The
experiments reflect two types of markets: one in which firms frequently develop short‐lived, perfectly
differentiated new products and another in which firms rarely develop such "killer" products and so almost
always compete to sell a homogeneous product.12

A. Experimental Design
In these experiments, undergraduate students with no prior experience in similar experimental markets made
innovation and pricing decisions. Prior to the start of the experiment, the subjects were randomly assigned into
groups of four, and they remained in their group for 25 subsequent periods. Each period was subdivided into
two stages: an Innovation stage and a Market stage. In Innovation stages, subjects made innovation expenditure
decisions, and in Market stages they made pricing decisions. Table 2 lists the key experimental parameters.
Table 2: Experimental Parameters
Parameter
Value
Endowment
$4.00
Attempts
[0, 20]
Cost per attempt
$0.10
Prob(Innovation|1 Attempt) 5%, 15%, or 25%

Price
[$8.25, $20.00]
Unit production costs
𝑞 ≤ 3
$8.15
𝑞 = 4
$8.25
𝑞 > 4
∞
Market stage length
Periods 1–5
60 seconds
Periods 6–25
40 seconds
5 Note: The $ sign denotes experimental dollars.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were endowed $4.00 (where the $ sign denotes experimental
dollars). In each Innovation stage, every subject was given the option of purchasing 𝑎 innovation attempts. Each
attempt cost $0.10. Subjects could purchase up to 20 attempts each period. Innovation was a Bernoulli process;
innovation attempts resulted in innovation success according to the function 𝜃(𝑎) = 1 − (1 − 𝜌)𝑎 . The
probability that any one attempt was successful, ρ, was 5%, 15%, or 25% as discussed below. Attempts were
purchased prior to the realization of the innovation outcomes, so all a attempts were paid for, regardless of
whether they were necessary to achieve innovation success ex post.
If a subject was successful, they developed a "New product" that they could sell as a monopolist for one (the
current) period. In other words, if a subject was successful in an Innovation stage, they posted a price in their
own New product market during the subsequent Market stage. Subjects who attempted no innovation, or who
were unsuccessful in their attempts, competed in a Bertrand–Edgeworth market with other unsuccessful sellers
from their group to sell a homogeneous "Standard product." As a function of the subjects' endogenous
innovation expenditures and the stochastic innovation process, this Standard product market contained either
1, 2, 3, or 4 sellers.13 If three of the four sellers in a group were successful, the lone unsuccessful subject in the
Standard product market had their price automatically set to the lowest allowable price of $8.25. This ensured
that no unsuccessful innovator enjoyed monopoly power. Figure 1 shows how market type and the number of
firms in the market were determined.14

Figure 1: Determination of Market Type and Size
The Market stage was timed. During the first five periods of the experiment, subjects had 60 seconds to submit a
price. For the final 20 periods, they had 40 seconds.15 They were permitted to change their price as many times
as they wished before time expired. While they could adjust their price, they could not see other subjects' prices
prior to the end of the stage. A red timer counted down the remaining market time in a prominent location on
each subject's computer screen.
For the entire experiment, the first 3 units a subject might sell cost $8.15 to produce. The 4th unit they might
sell cost $8.25. Sellers were capacity‐constrained at 4 units. Units were "made to order," so production costs
were only borne for units actually sold. Market demand and one seller's marginal costs are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Experimental Market Demand
The demand sides of the markets were automated. Each computerized buyer demanded a single unit at a
unique reservation price. The queue was not random; buyers "queued up" in descending order of their
reservation price ($10.01, $9.76, $9.51,...). In New markets, the monopolist seller sold up to 4 units, depending
on how many buyers had reservation prices above their posted price. In Standard markets, the seller posting the
lowest price had the opportunity to make sales first. Buyers bought from a seller, conditional on that seller's
price being less than their reservation price. If there was residual demand after the low‐price seller made sales,
the seller with the next lowest price could make sales. Thus, it was possible (and most often the case) that units
of the homogeneous product sold for different prices in the same Standard market. When two or more sellers
posted the same price, market demand was split evenly when possible. The experimental software randomly
awarded the extra unit(s) in cases where demand could not be evenly split.
Because I am interested in differences in collusion across treatments and not collusion per se, the Market stage
was constructed to lessen the coordination burden of collusion. It had the following features: (1) subjects could
adjust their price as many times as they wished before market time expired, (2) their prices were publicly
posted, (3) subjects were identified by numbers (i.e., Seller 1, ..., Seller 4) that were fixed throughout all 25
periods, (4) subjects could send unrestricted chat messages during Standard Market stages, and (5) subjects
received feedback at the end of each period on the quantities sold by all members of their group. These features
facilitated collusion in other experimental studies.16 They were present in all treatments.
There were two main treatments: a LO treatment where the chance of innovation success per attempt was 𝜌 =
5%, and a HI treatment where 𝜌 = 15%. A third, "super" high innovation (SHI) treatment with 𝜌 = 25% is
discussed below. Aside from the different ρ's, the treatments were exactly identical. Prior to the start of the
experiment, subjects read instructions and had to successfully complete a short quiz on their content before
proceeding. Although the rationing rules for the two market types were explained to the subjects in detail, they
were not told the specific reservation prices of the automated buyers. Please see Appendix S1 (Supporting
Information) for the instructions.

B. Innovation Benchmarks
In this section, I report innovation benchmarks for each treatment.17 Because innovation decisions were
independent across periods, I construct the benchmarks for a single, representative period. To derive innovation
benchmarks, I first determine Market stage profits and then use these values to calculate the benchmarks. I
assume risk‐neutral firms who innovate symmetrically. In other words, I assume that four firms independently
select 𝑎 innovation attempts each period.
The Market stage prices, quantities, and profits used to calculate innovation benchmarks are shown in Table 3.
Recall from Section III.A that price in the 𝑛 = 1 Standard market is set to $8.25, which implies 4.00 units sold. A

unique pure strategy equilibrium of $8.25 exists for the three‐ and four‐seller Standard markets but there is no
pure strategy price equilibrium for the two‐seller market.18 In the three‐seller Standard market, firms sell
2.67 units in expectation (8 units divided by three sellers), and in the four‐seller Standard market each firm sells
2.00 units. For the two‐seller case, I calculate the mean of the distribution of prices in the symmetric mixed‐
strategy equilibrium to be $8.59, and I assume a quantity of 3.00 units.19 Finally, in the 𝑛 = 1 New market,
profit‐maximization implies 4.00 units sold at a price of $9.26. Importantly, the prices in Table 3 are the same
across the LO, HI, and SHI treatments. In addition to calculating benchmarks using the profits in Table 3, I
calculate a second set of benchmarks using actual profit data from the experiments (this is described below).
Table 3: Market Values
Market Type
Price
Standard 𝑛 = 1 8.25
Standard 𝑛 = 2 8.59
Standard 𝑛 = 3 8.25
Standard 𝑛 = 4 8.25
New (𝑛 = 1)
9.26

Quantity
4.00
3.00
2.67
2.00
4.00

Profit
0.30
1.32
0.27
0.20
4.34

Every period, there are 16 (2𝑛 ) possible innovation outcomes in the four firm market. Firm 𝑖 successfully
innovates in eight of the outcomes and is unsuccessful and ends up in a Standard market in the other half of the
outcomes. For the three firms that are not Firm 𝑖, let 𝜙𝑛 (𝑎) = [𝜃(𝑎)]3−𝑛 [1 − 𝜃(𝑎)]𝑛 be the probability
that 𝑛 ≤ 3 of these firms fail to successfully innovate when all firms independently make 𝑎 innovation
attempts.
Among the eight cases where Firm 𝑖 is unsuccessful, there are three outcomes where two firms besides
Firm 𝑖 are unsuccessful (3𝜙2 ) and three outcomes where one other firm besides Firm 𝑖 is unsuccessful (3𝜙1 ).
There is also one outcome where all three firms besides Firm 𝑖 are unsuccessful (𝜙3 ) and one outcome where
Firm 𝑖 is the only unsuccessful firm (𝜙0 ). Putting this together, Firm 𝑖 's expected profit in the event that all four
firms innovate symmetrically is:
Π𝑖𝑎 = 𝜃𝑎𝜋𝑁 + 1 − 𝜃𝑎𝜙3𝑎𝜋3 + 3𝜙2𝑎𝜋2 + 3𝜙1𝑎𝜋1 + 𝜙0𝑎𝜋0 − 𝑐𝑎 (1)
where 𝜋𝑁 is the New market profit and 𝜋𝑛 is the profit in the Standard market with 𝑛 firms. The coefficient 𝑐 is
the cost per innovation attempt, which was $0.10 in the experiments.
The innovation benchmarks that I report for each treatment are the 𝑎 ∈ [0, 20] that maximize Πi (𝑎).
Equivalently, they are the number of attempts (𝑎∗ ) for which the expected marginal return from innovation
equals the marginal cost of innovation. Figure 3 plots the expected marginal return from innovation for each
treatment. The vertical axis is denominated in experimental dollars ($)—the currency used in the experiments.
The expected return varies across treatments because the probability of success per attempt parameter (ρ)
varies across treatments. The innovation success function in LO is less concave than the related functions in SHI
and HI, so the expected marginal return curve for LO in Figure 3 is flatter than the marginal return curves for SHI
and HI.

Figure 3: Expected Marginal Return and Cost of Innovation
Table 4 lists the innovation benchmarks and shows the likelihood that a firm ends up in the New market if they
choose the benchmark number of attempts, that is, the probability 𝜃(𝑎∗ ). Note that the SHI benchmark is eight
attempts because, as Figure 3 shows, the expected marginal return to nine attempts is less than the marginal
cost of nine attempts and non‐integer attempts (e.g., 8.4) were not permitted in the experiment.
Table 4: Innovation Benchmarks
Treatment Number of Attempts (Calculated
with Theoretical Profit)

New Market
Likelihood

Number of Attempts
New Market
(Calculated
Likelihood
with Actual Profit)
LO‐R
14
0.51
9
0.37
HI‐R
11
0.83
8
0.73
LO‐LA
14
0.51
9
0.37
HI‐LA
11
0.83
7
0.68
SHI‐LA
8
0.90
8
0.90
6 Note: The actual profit benchmarks were generated using the observed average profits from each treatment
(see Table ).
Because prices actually observed in the experiments may differ substantially from the prices in Table 3, I also
calculate innovation benchmarks using the average prices in each treatment. In other words, I use the prices in
Table (see below) for (𝜋𝑁 , 𝜋1 , 𝜋2 , 𝜋3 , 𝜋4 ). Table 4 suggests that LO subjects may attempt more innovation
than HI or SHI subjects.20 When actual profits are used to generate innovation benchmarks, the benchmarks
suggest similar amounts of innovation attempted in each treatment.
There are two results from this section to reiterate in summary: (1) For any market type, observed prices should
be the same across treatments, and (2) LO subjects should attempt more innovation than HI or SHI subjects, but
are likely to spend more time during the experiment in Standard markets than are HI or SHI subjects.21

C. Results
The experiments were conducted at two universities: a large, public research school (R) and a small, private
liberal arts school (LA).22 Subjects were recruited with ORSEE at the research school (Greiner, 2015) and by
proprietary recruitment software at the liberal arts school. In both locations, the experiment was executed in z‐
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All treatments lasted approximately 1.5 hours, including roughly 15 minutes of

computerized instructions. There were a total of 240 subjects, 48 in each treatment. Subjects had no previous
experience in similar markets and no subject participated more than once.23 I now report the experimental
results.

Did Innovation Vary across Treatments?
I first focus on the Innovation stage data from the LO and HI treatments and ask: did attempted innovation vary
across treatments, and if so, did subjects get differential experience in certain market types across treatments?
I begin by reporting the distribution of innovation attempts. Figures 4A and 4D are kernel density estimates of
the average number of innovation attempts per subject (the average is across all 25 periods), by treatment.
Individual frequency distributions are also presented in the Appendix for all 240 subjects. In Figure 4, there
appears to be a treatment difference across LO and HI in the R data, but not in the LA data.

Figure 4: Innovation Results, by Treatment
Figures 4B and 4E show the average number of innovation attempts per market across time. Clearly, on average,
subjects in both treatments under‐invested in innovation relative to the benchmarks from Section B.24 Figure 3
suggests a possible explanation for this result: for a small number of attempts, the expected marginal return
from an attempt is greater in HI than in LO. Subjects may have keyed on this fact instead of on equating the
marginal return and marginal cost of innovation.
Despite the benchmarks suggesting more innovation attempts in LO than HI, HI subjects attempted more
innovation than LO subjects in both populations. The attempts graphs in Figure 4 and the average attempts per
period figures in Table 5 indicate that the level of innovation attempted was not robust to changes in the subject
population. For each treatment, the liberal arts school subjects attempted less innovation than the research
school subjects. However, there was a robust treatment effect: in both populations, subjects attempted more
innovation in HI than LO.
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Subjects
Markets
Success per attempt (ρ)
Mean attempts per period
Time in New market
Time in Standard market
Modal # firms in market
Mean period earnings ($)

LO‐R
48
12
5%
2.42
10%
90%
4
0.66

HI‐R
48
12
15%
4.43
46%
54%
1
1.62

LO‐LA
48
12
5%
1.67
7%
93%
4
0.71

HI‐LA
48
12
15%
2.45
27%
73%
1
1.19

SHI‐LA
48
12
25%
2.99
52%
48%
1
1.93

Mean total earnings ($)
16.94 40.58 18.04
7 Note: The $ symbol denotes experimental dollars.

29.91 48.26

Because innovation success was an increasing function of the number of innovation attempts, and because
more innovation was attempted in HI, LO and HI subjects had differential experience in certain market types.
Figures 4C and 4F show the distribution of market‐periods across the number of firms in the market (denoted
by n).25 In both figures, "New" refers to the New market, and 𝑛 = 1 refers to the 𝑛 = 1 Standard market.
The number of market‐periods of experience increased monotonically with the number of firms in the market in
both LO treatments (ignoring the 𝑛 = 1 Standard market type). By contrast, in the HI‐R treatment, the number
of market‐periods decreased monotonically with the number of firms in the market (again, ignoring 𝑛 = 1
Standard markets). Table 5 shows that the modal number of firms in the market was 𝑛 = 4 in LO, but was the
New (𝑛 = 1) market in the HI treatment. Subjects were in Standard markets 90% and 93% of the time in LO‐R
and LO‐LA, respectively, but were in a Standard market just 54% of the time in HI‐R.
As predicted by the innovation benchmarks, LO‐R subjects ended up in Standard markets more frequently than
HI‐R subjects. Interestingly, while HI‐LA subjects attempted more innovation than LO‐LA subjects, they did not
attempt nearly as much innovation as HI‐R subjects. As a result, HI‐LA subjects spent 73% of their time in a
Standard market. Because relatively little innovation was attempted in HI‐LA, an additional SHI treatment was
conducted with subjects from the liberal arts school population. The chance of innovation success per attempt
was ρ = 25% for this treatment. This value of ρ was chosen with the hope of replicating a distribution for the
number of firms in the market that is closer to HI‐R than HI‐LA.
To see the effect of increasing ρ to 25% in the LA subject population, compare HI‐R in Figure C to HI‐LA and SHI‐
LA in Figure 4F. This comparison shows that the distribution of the number of firms in the market in SHI‐LA was
much closer to that in HI‐R than it was to the distribution of the number of firms in the market in HI‐LA. Having
established that LO‐R (LO‐LA) subjects spent more time in Standard markets and less time in New markets than
HI‐R (SHI‐LA) subjects, I now report Market stage data, beginning with an analysis of chat messages in Standard
markets.

How Did Subjects Communicate?
Table 6 lists the total number of chat messages, the total number of chat messages that contained a number
(e.g., a price), and the 15 most frequently used words, each by treatment.26 The total number of messages is
also reported per Standard market‐period to account for the greater Standard market experience of LO subjects.
The data suggest that subjects in LO treatments communicated more frequently than their higher innovation
treatment counterparts. Across all Standard markets, LO‐R subjects communicated nearly three times as often
as HI‐R subjects. They sent an average of 2.6 chat messages per market‐period, compared to 0.9 messages per
market‐period in HI‐R. In the liberal arts school sessions, LO‐LA subjects sent over one and a half times as many
messages per market‐period as SHI‐LA subjects (3.3 to 2.0), and exactly one and a half times as many messages
per market‐period as HI‐LA subjects (3.3 to 2.2).
Table 6: Chat Analysis
Total messages (mean per
market‐period)
Total messages containing a
number (percent of total)
Most frequently used words
(times used)

LO‐R
783 (2.6)

HI‐R
201 (0.9)

LO‐LA
967 (3.3)

HI‐LA
591 (2.2)

SHI‐LA
390 (2.0)

316 (40%)

84 (42%)

417 (43%)

246 (42%)

122 (31%)

all (92)

all (34)

all (110)

all (87)

all (58)

you (63)

put (25)

you (90)

price (73)

price (55)

seller (62)
price (24)
time (61)
you (66)
you (47)
price (49)
lets (23)
try (53)
money (48)
money (32)
one (48)
same (22)
price (52)
make (48)
have (29)
put (45) profit (18)
money (51)
put (37)
high (29)
time (42) money (15)
make (48)
try (36)
make (29)
everyone (39)
make (13)
more (48)
have (36) everyone (28)
try (36)
you (13) everyone (48)
time (35)
will (26)
money (36)
time (12)
seller (43)
same (34)
more (26)
then (33)
more (11)
lets (41)
lets (33)
sell (26)
profit (29)
then (10)
one (41)
high (33)
time (25)
each (29) should (10)
then (39)
seller (33)
same (23)
get (29)
one (9)
will (34)
more (31)
each (23)
more (29)
will (8)
round (33) everyone (30)
seller (23)
8 Note: Only words with more than two letters are listed and the words the, and, this, that, for, what, and lol are
excluded.
Several recent papers explore issues related to antitrust enforcement using experiments, but because of the
complexity of the subjects' decision task in this paper, these experiments had no "antitrust enforcement."27
Adding enforcement to this design ran the risk of overwhelming subjects, and as noted in Section III.A, this paper
focuses on collusion across treatments, not on the existence of collusion per se. Because subjects faced no
threat of punishment for explicitly communicating about prices, messages from early periods included:
Period 2 of a LO‐R market: " do you guys want to each sell at the same price? "
Period 3 of a SHI‐LA market: " lets all do above 8.25 "
Period 4 of a HI‐LA market: " Why don't we both sell at high prices? "
Period 3 of a LO‐LA market: " lets try something like 915? "
Period 5 of a HI‐R market: " dont do 8.25 then none of us profit silly "
Period 7 of a LO‐R market: " can we all agree on $9? "
Period 8 of a HI‐R market: " how about we all put the same price "
Period 8 of a SHI‐LA market: " we will all make more go high not low "
As these examples suggest, price discussions often involve numbers. Table 6 reveals that in four of the five
treatments, messages included numbers 40%–43% of the time. In SHI‐LA, only 31% of messages contained a
number.
The most frequently used words in each treatment are listed in Table 6, and the number of times each word was
used is in parenthesis. Note that the words are essentially identical across treatments. High usage of words
like all, everyone, and lets, as well as price, money, and profit indicate that as in previous collusion experiments
with communication, subjects used the chat interface to further price manipulation. But were subjects equally
successful at price fixing across treatments? To answer this question, I turn to this paper's main empirical results
that compare prices across the treatments.

Did Prices Vary across Treatments?
In this paper, "collusive success" refers to firms' abilities to maintain supra‐competitive prices, so in this section I
report price data from the experiments as averages and distributions. Table 7 contains average market prices.
For market m in period t, let the share‐weighted market price be:
𝑛

𝑚𝑡 𝑖
𝑝̅𝑡𝑚 = ∑𝑖=1
𝑠𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑡𝑖 ,(2)

Table7: Average Market Prices
Number of Firms Theory LO‐R HI‐R
LO‐LA HI‐LA SHI‐LA Mean
𝑛 = 1 (New)
9.26
9.34
9.30
9.15
9.28
9.24
9.26
(0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
𝑛 = 2
8.59
8.80
8.68
8.71
8.79
8.73
8.74
(0.14) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
𝑛 = 3
8.25
8.58
8.58
8.85
8.66
8.57
8.65
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
𝑛 = 4
8.25
8.62
8.44
8.72
8.63
8.36
8.55
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
9 Notes: Theoretical prices are explained in Section III.B. Average market price is Equation (2) averaged over all
markets (in a treatment) and time. All prices in experimental dollars. Standard errors in parenthesis.
where 𝑛𝑚𝑡 denotes the number of sellers in market m in period 𝑡, and 𝑠𝑡𝑖 and 𝑝𝑡𝑖 are Firm 𝑖 's market share and
price, respectively. The average market price is 𝑝̅𝑡𝑚 averaged over all similar markets and over all periods.
Table 7 shows that average market prices decreased in the number of firms in the market. Note that the average
New market price across all treatments was exactly the theoretical profit‐maximizing price. For each Standard
market type, average market prices were all above the theoretical prices. Pooling and averaging the price
statistics from Table for the two LO treatments and comparing the result to the pooled average for the three
HI/SHI treatments, there is no large price difference for the 𝑛 = 1 New markets (the LO average is $0.01
greater). However, the LO price averages are $0.05, $0.09, and $0.10 greater than the HI/SHI price averages in
the 𝑛 = 2, 𝑛 = 3, and 𝑛 = 4 Standard markets, respectively. In other words, average prices were higher in LO
markets relative to HI/SHI markets.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of average market prices across treatments. It contains empirical cumulative
distribution functions for the New market and the 𝑛 > 1 Standard markets. The horizontal axis in the figures
is 𝑝̅𝑡𝑚 . Some treatment differences are apparent in Figure 5. In Figures 5A and 5C, the distribution of prices from
LO‐LA is different from the distributions of prices in the other treatments. In Figure 5D, the distributions of
prices from HI‐R and SHI‐LA are different from the distributions of prices in the other treatments.

Figure 5: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions, by Market Type and Size

I conduct robust rank order tests to determine if the price differences suggested by Table 7 and Figure 5 are
statistically significant.28 The tests were conducted on market average prices over all periods because
observations are not independent across periods. I pool the LO data and the HI/SHI data across subject
populations, so the null hypothesis for each test is that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for
the LO treatments equals the corresponding mean for the HI/SHI treatments.
Table 8 indicates that there is no significant difference in price across the LO and HI/SHI data for the 𝑛 = 1 New
market and for the 𝑛 = 2 Standard market. The null hypothesis can be rejected at 𝛼 = 0.10 for the 𝑛 = 3
Standard markets and it can also be rejected at 𝛼 = 0.05 for the 𝑛 = 4 Standard markets.29 The comparisons
in this section all indicate that average prices were higher in LO Standard markets relative to HI and SHI Standard
markets. What explains this result?
Table 8: Robust Rank Order Test Results for Price
Number of Firms U
p Value
𝑛 = 1 (New)
1.182 0.237
𝑛 = 2
−0.357 0.721
𝑛 = 3
−1.693 0.090
𝑛 = 4
−2.566 0.010
10 Note: The null hypothesis for each test is that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for the
LO treatments equals the corresponding mean for the HI/SHI treatments.

Does Experience Explain the Price Variance?
In light of the price data, note again the disparity in the number of 𝑛 = 4 market‐periods across the low and
higher innovation treatments in Figure 4. Did LO subjects' greater experience in the 𝑛 = 4 markets affect
prices?
Figure 6 graphs market price on market experience for the Standard markets with the most firms (𝑛 = 4).
Specifically, it shows the average of 𝑝̅𝑡𝑚 over t on the number of 𝑛 = 4 market‐periods for market m. The line in
the figure was generated by the ordinary least squares regression:
𝑇
1
∑
𝑝̅𝑡𝑚
𝑇
𝑡=1

0.016

8.382
= (0.056)
+ (0.004) ⋅ Experience𝑚 , (3)

Figure 6: Market Price on 𝑛 = 4 Market Experience

where Experience𝑚 is the total number of periods that market m was in a 𝑛 = 4 market.30 Across all
treatments, market experience had a significant, positive effect on market price in 𝑛 = 4 markets.
While it is conceivable that experience was endogenous to price in the above regression, this is unlikely in
principle. Even if all firms post the joint monopoly price of $9.26 in an 𝑛 = 4 market, they only receive one‐
quarter of the profit they would receive in a New market.31 So it seems unlikely that firms would reduce their
innovation expenditure (which affects experience) because of the market price. Still, I now examine individual
innovation decisions to see if past collusive success affected future innovation decisions.

Did Collusive Success Affect Innovation?
The preceding results suggest that the exogenously determined likelihood of innovative success affected market
outcomes. It is also possible that market outcomes, in turn, endogenously affected innovation decisions. For
example, subjects who successfully coordinated to raise market price may have subsequently curtailed their
innovative activity.
To investigate the relationship between collusive success and subjects' innovation expenditures, a distributed
lag model was estimated for each subject:
Innovation𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + ∑5𝑘=1 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 ⋅ Profit 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , (4)
where Innovation𝑖,𝑡 is subject 𝑖′s innovation expenditure and Profit 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 k is market profit (gross of innovation
expenditures) in period 𝑡 − 𝑘. The coefficient estimate 𝛽̂𝑖,1 is the impulse propensity in innovation expenditure
from changes in market profit during period 𝑡 − 1. If a subject successfully coordinates with other subjects to
raise the Standard market price, and then reduces his or her innovation expenditure in order to profit
maximize, 𝛽̂𝑖,1 < 0. In other words, if innovation expenditure is endogenous to collusive success, the impulse
propensity is negative.
Figure 7 shows 𝛽̂𝑖,1 for each subject, organized by treatment, when specification (4) was estimated separately
for all 240 subjects with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Because of the five lags, each
estimating sample had 20 observations. Estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level (two‐
tailed t test) are filled‐in. Table 9 shows the percentage of βi,1 estimates that are both negative and statistically
significant when specification (4) is estimated with between one and five lagged profit values.

Figure 7: Estimates of 𝛽𝑖,1 in Model 4

Table 9: Summary of Impulse Propensity Estimation

Number of
Lags

Number of
Regressions

1
2
3
4
5

240
240
240
240
240

Observations
Per
Regression
24
23
22
21
20

̂ 𝒊,𝟏 < 𝟎
𝜷

̂ 𝒊,𝟏 < 𝟎 Significant
𝜷
at
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏

34.6%
34.2%
36.7%
34.2%
31.7%

0.4%
1.3%
1.3%
0.8%
1.7%

𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓

2.9%
4.6%
2.9%
3.8%
4.6%

𝜶
= 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎
6.3%
7.1%
7.1%
5.0%
5.0%

Note that regardless of the number of lags included in (4), fewer than 5% of the estimated impulse propensities
are negative and significant when 𝛼 = 0.05. To the extent that serial correlation is present in the data, even the
significant estimates in Figure 7 and Table 9 may be chimeric, as serial correlation lowers standard errors.
Finally, the economic magnitude of the estimates is trivial. For the five‐lag specification, they suggest that, on
average, a $1.00 increase in market profit resulted in a $0.02 increase in innovation expenditure.
As a robustness check on the impulse propensity results, a second regression was estimated by pooled ordinary
least squares. The specification is:
𝐿

240

Innovation𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜓 + 𝛿0 Period𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 ⋅ Profit 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖 ⋅ Subject 𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 ,
𝑘=1

𝑖=1

where Period𝑡 is a linear time trend, the number of lags is 𝐿 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and Subject 𝑖 is individual
subject 𝑖′s fixed effect. Standard errors were clustered at the market level.
Table 10 shows the results of estimating specification (5). Regardless of the number of lags that are included in
estimation (one to five), the coefficient estimates on lagged profit are always highly significant and positive.
Moreover, the magnitude of each estimate is very small. Table 10 thus suggests—in line with the summary of
individual regression results in Table 9—that an increase in market profit did not reduce innovation expenditure.
Table 10: Regression Results
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Innovation Expenditure
Constant
0.259
(0.017)
Period
−0.001
(0.001)
Profitt−1
0.021
(0.004)
Profitt−2
Profitt−3
Profitt−4
Profitt−5

0.173
(0.017)
0.001
(0.001)
0.019
(0.003)
0.014
(0.003)

0.162
(0.018)
0.001
(0.001)
0.018
(0.003)
0.013
(0.003)
0.011
(0.003)

0.134
(0.020)
0.002
(0.001)
0.018
(0.003)
0.011
(0.003)
0.009
(0.002)
0.009
(0.002)

0.132
(0.021)
0.002
(0.001)
0.016
(0.003)
0.010
(0.003)
0.008
(0.002)
0.008
(0.002)
0.008
(0.002)

Fixed effects
Subject
Subject Subject Subject Subject
R2
0.59
0.64
0.67
0.70
0.71
Observations
5,760
5,520
5,280
5,040
4,800
11 Notes: Coefficient estimates on individual subject fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors (clustered at
the market level) in parentheses.
12 *Significant at the 10% level.
13 **Significant at the 5% level.
14 *** Significant at the 1% level.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The experimental results in this paper can be summarized as follows: the exogenously greater likelihood of
innovation in HI and SHI induced more innovation expenditure in those markets relative to the LO markets. This
difference translated into more 𝑛 = 4 market experience for LO subjects relative to HI‐R and SHI‐LA subjects.
Market experience then affected the success of price collusion in the manner suggested by Chamberlin (1962):
If [the firm] is in business permanently, the temporary gains of a price cut are of negligible
importance...On the other hand, if [the firm] is in the market only temporarily, bent on disposing of a
certain amount of product, the ultimate consequences do not enter into [its] calculations.
In the experiments, it was as though HI‐R and SHI‐LA subjects inhabited a world of "killer" products. These
subjects were in Standard markets far less frequently than their LO counterparts, they rarely ended up in 𝑛 = 4
markets, and often enjoyed monopoly‐like profit in New markets. The data suggest that when they were in
Standard markets, the long‐term benefits of abstaining from price sniping did not resonate with HI‐R and SHI‐LA
subjects.
The situation was different in LO markets. One LO subject lamented, "the innovative stage is a visual
representation of [hopes] and dreams being crushed," and another bemoaned, "I wonder what the new market
is even like." The LO treatment was like a market devoid of killer products. Meager profits and the prospect of
similar future earnings impressed upon LO subjects the necessity of cooperation. Because innovation was
infrequent in LO, it was not as disruptive to coordination as in HI‐R or SHI‐LA.
Importantly, the data provide scant evidence that collusive success affected innovation decisions. Rather, they
indicate that successful Market stage collusion did not feed back and greatly affect Innovation stage
expenditure. The observed difference in innovation across treatments stemmed from the exogenous difference
in the likelihood of innovation and not from any endogenous changes in subject innovation expenditure because
of market outcomes.
If the likelihood of product innovation affects price collusion, this helps explain why price collusion appears
endemic in many markets. Firms that cannot escape competition through product innovation may turn to
conspiracy as an alternative avenue to supra‐competitive profit. Because these firms cannot innovate their way
to higher profit, they return time and again to price manipulation. Instead of merry trade meetings turning to
conspiracy, in LO markets the scene may be better set by Shakespeare than Smith: "O mischief, thou art swift to
enter in the thoughts of desperate men!"

APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 11: Collusion Sample
Citation SIC Code Industry
61,368
62,519
63,658
63,659
75,060
63,424
63,091
63,198
63,370
64,503
64,555
63,180
62,235
74,657
75,197
61,664
62,215
62,217
65,724
63,586
62,916
62,702
64,823
74,929
63,090
63,475
62,992
61,739
64,222
63,000
63,181
75,245
63,643
63,227
62,517
63,092
74,945
60,615
63,205
60,785
63,609
60,846
63,215

3273
3273
3273
3273
3271
3272
2026
2026
2026
2026
2026
2011
2062
3442
2051
2051
2051
2051
2051
2951
3353
3449
2076
2077
3449
3356
2657
2499
3,452
3496
2673
2096
2041
2048
3494
3643
2298
2672
2672
3965
3639
3089
3613

R&D
Intensity
Ready‐mix concrete
n/a
Ready‐mix concrete
n/a
Ready‐mix concrete
n/a
Ready‐mix concrete
n/a
Concrete blocks
0.000
Precast concrete products
0.000
Dairy products
0.001
Dairy products
0.001
Dairy products
0.001
Dairy products
0.001
Fluid milk
0.001
Meat packing
0.001
Refined sugar
0.001
Garage doors
0.002
Bread
0.002
Bread products
0.002
Bakery products
0.002
Bakery products
0.002
Pastries
0.002
Asphalt and concrete sales
0.002
Aluminum roll jacketing
0.003
Reinforcing steel bars
0.003
Coconut oil
0.003
Rendering
0.003
Reinforcing steel bars
0.003
Titanium mill products
0.004
Folding cartons
0.005
Toilet seats
0.005
Standard screws
0.006
Swine confinement systems
0.006
Consumer bags
0.007
Snack foods
0.007
Blended foods
0.007
Livestock feed
0.008
Furnace pipe and fittings
0.010
Wiring devices
0.013
Nylon twine
0.013
Paper labels
0.015
Pressure sensitive tape
0.015
Zipper sliders
0.016
Water heaters
0.016
Drainage or plastic pipe fittings 0.017
Fuse products
0.018

61,447 2865
Dyes
0.020
63,844 2869
Dimethyl sulfoxide
0.020
63,784 3541
Metal‐working machinery
0.024
65,742 3952
Art materials
0.024
62,901 2821
Persulfate
0.025
63,610 2821
Coatings resins
0.025
63,622 3824
Gas meters
0.043
15 Notes: Horizontal price collusion in manufacturing industries, 1972–1982. Citations from Commerce Clearing
House Trade Cases books. R&D intensity calculated from LOB data.
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GRAPH: Appendix S1. Full instructions as they appeared to subjects in the LO [HI] treatment at the research
school

Footnotes
1 Quoted in Sonnenfeld and Lawrence ([32]).
2 See Hay and Kelley ([20]), Asch and Seneca ([2]), Fraas and Greer ([17]), Scherer and Ross ([30]), Dick ([13]),
Symeonidis ([33]), and Levenstein and Suslow ([25]).
3 The full links between product innovation, product differentiation, and price collusion have also received little
attention in the theoretical price fixing literature. For example, in a general model examining "product
differentiation‐collusion sustainability," Colombo ([11]) treats product differentiation as exogenous.
4 On the use of LOB data, see Scherer et al. ([29]) and Ravenscraft and Wagner ([27]).
5 This assumes that R&D intensity in the ready‐mix concrete industry is below average—a safe assumption. Of
the 220 industries in the LOB data for which R&D intensity can be calculated, 140 (64%) have below
average R&D intensity.
6 Note that these are Probit coefficient estimates and not marginal effects. Because the LOB report cautions:
"Special care is necessary when the specialization ratio or the coverage ratio is relatively low," the
estimating sample for both specifications is restricted to only include industries with coverage and
specialization ratios above the respective ratio's sample mean minus two standard errors.
7 These were obtained for 1977 from Weiss and Pascoe ([34]).
8 Correlations among the regressors and variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all low, but the condition number is
high (39.2).
9 Also, SIC industries are not antitrust markets; they are generally much broader in scope than antitrust markets
(Werden [35]). An example specific to this sample is a price conspiracy involving three gas meter
manufacturers. The relevant SIC industry includes not only gas meters, but also odometers, parking
meters, pedometers, production counters, speedometers, tachometers, taxi meters, and many other
products.
10 Unfortunately, firm‐level data have their own issues. In particular, R&D expenditure data are generally only
available for public firms. Moreover, such data are rarely available at the line of business level (where
antitrust violations occur). For example, DuPont participated in an automotive refinishing paint price
conspiracy in the early 1990s. While aggregate R&D data are easily obtained for DuPont, disaggregated
R&D data are not readily available for DuPont's automotive paint LOB.
11 This is not a design where firms cooperate on R&D, and perhaps subsequently engage in price collusion. See
Potters and Suetens ([26]) for a survey of experimental work in this domain.
12 This design is geared towards examining the relationship between innovation and conduct, as opposed to
innovation and (market) structure. For experiments on the latter, see Darai, Sacco, and Schmutzler
([12]), Sacco and Schmutzler ([28]), and Aghion et al. ([1]).
13 It may be helpful to picture this experimental environment in the following way: four similar firms can engage
in product innovation over many years. Developing a new product gives a particular firm temporary
market power, but new innovations can be quickly copied by the other firms. Firms that do not develop
a new product must compete on price with any other non‐innovating firms. As reported in Section C, the
data indicate that noninnovators can successfully collude when the duration of market power is just one
period. If the duration of market power were more than one period, collusion among unsuccessful
subjects might be even more successful.
14 An alternative experimental design where each subject's market type is imposed exogenously would have
certain advantages over the design employed, namely, no possibility of market competition affecting

innovation. However, I examine the possibility that market outcomes affect innovation in "Did Collusive
Success Affect Innovation?" section and find no evidence that they do.
15 This design element was induced to potentially speed up the experiment, but in practice the time limit was
never binding for the vast majority of subjects.
16 For example, Holt and Davis ([21]) report that price announcements increase prices in posted‐price markets
(at least temporarily), Huck, Müller, and Normann ([22]) show that fixed matching increases collusion,
and Fonseca and Normann ([16]) demonstrate that communication increases collusion in Bertrand
oligopolies.
17 These are not equilibria levels of innovation.
18 In the two‐seller case, either firm would prefer to charge a monopoly price (above 8.25) relative to a residual
inverse demand curve, so 8.25 is not an equilibrium price.
19 Either duopolist can be assured $1.22 from selling 2 units at $8.76. This is the upper bound on the price
support for the equilibrium mixing distribution. It follows from 4p‾−38.15−8.25=1.22 that the lower
bound is $8.48. The equilibrium cumulative distribution for price is F(p) = (33.92 − 4p)/(16.40 − 2p). The
median price of $8.57 is calculated by setting F(p) = 0.5. To determine the mean price, F(p) is calculated
for all incremental prices of $0.001 on [8.480, 8.760]. The probability of any one incremental price being
chosen is estimated numerically. Finally, the mean price of $8.59 is calculated by summing all
incremental prices multiplied by their associated probabilities.
20 The result that innovation expenditure is inversely related to the probability of innovation success follows
from the fact that market profits and the marginal cost of innovation are assumed to be identical across
treatments. This is crucial for focusing on the effect of the likelihood of innovation success on collusion,
but if market profit and the probability of success are not orthogonal, then it may be true that more
innovation should be attempted in markets with a higher likelihood of innovation success relative to
markets with a lower likelihood of innovation success.
21 Because the experiments had known, finite time horizons, a Folk Theorem result with a supra‐competitive
price equilibrium in the Market stage is not strictly applicable. But experiments have shown that
subjects can be cooperative in finite‐horizon games (see, e.g., Huck, Normann, and Oechssler [23]). If
supra‐competitive pricing is observed in the Standard markets it will be precisely because subjects are
"cooperative."
22 All the LA data were collected after the collection of all of the R data. Subject behavior in the experiments
need not be identical across the two schools. What is important is that any treatment differences—if
they exist—are robust across the two subject populations.
23 Per the laboratory rules at the two schools, subjects received US$10.00 at the research school and US$7.00 at
the liberal arts school for arriving at the computer lab on time. To equalize the average total payments
across subject populations, the exchange rate between dollars and experimental currency was US$0.30
for $1.00 for the research school sessions and US$0.50 for $1.00 for the subjects at the liberal arts
school.
24 Under‐investment is also observed in similar experimental environments in Isaac and Reynolds ([24]) and
Smyth ([31]).
25 A market‐period is the observation of a particular market type in a particular period. The number of market‐
periods in any given period ranged from 1 (zero subjects successfully innovated) to 4 (all subjects
successfully innovated). Thus, the number of market‐periods is not identical to the
number markets × periods. During one of the sessions, an error was detected in the software code. This
glitch affected two market‐periods in the LO‐LA treatment. These market‐periods are dropped from the
analysis.
26 Full chat transcripts are available from the author.
27 See Bigoni et al. ([5]) and the references therein, and Block and Gerety ([6]).

28 Robust rank order tests are used because in three of the four cases, a null hypothesis of equal variance is
rejected.
29 A robust rank order test indicates that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for LO‐R is
greater than the corresponding mean for HI‐R (U= 2.13, p= 0.033, two‐tailed). The same is true for the
equivalent LO‐LA and SHI‐LA comparison (U= 4.76, p< 0.001, two‐tailed).
30 Standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimate on experience is still statistically, significantly
different from zero (p< .001) when an indicator variable for subject population is added to specification
(3). The coefficient estimate for this indicator is not significantly different from zero (p= 0.297).
31 This calculus does ignore the costs savings from foregoing all innovation attempts.
* I am grateful to the Michael J. Piette Fellowship and to the Economic Science Institute for funding. I thank
Mark Isaac, Gary Fournier, Cortney Rodet, Bart Wilson, and seminar participants at Florida State,
Chapman, Marquette, Massachusetts Amherst, and the London Experimental Workshop for helpful
comments. I also thank two anonymous referees and Anthony Kwasnica for comments that have
improved the paper. Naturally, any errors are my own.
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